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Abstract. A new scheme for computationally secure \online secret shar-
ing" is presented, in which the shares of the participants can be reused.
The security of the scheme is based on the intractability of factoring.
This scheme has the advantage that it detects cheating and enables the
identication of all cheaters, regardless of their number, improving on
previous results by Pinch and Ghodosi et al.
1 Introduction
A secret sharing scheme is a protocol in which a dealer distributes shares of a
secret among a set of participants such that only sets of participants belonging
to an access structure can recover the secret at a later time. Secret sharing
schemes were independently invented in 1979 by Blakley [1] and Shamir [8]. In
1988, Tompa and Woll [9] demonstrated that Shamir's original (t; n) threshold
scheme is vulnerable to cheating. That is, the last participant of an authorised set
can always cheat the other participants during the reconstruction of the secret,
without being detected. As a result the dishonest participant obtains the true
secret while the other participants obtain a false one.
Cachin [2] proposed a protocol for online secret sharing for general access
structures, in which all the shares are as short as the secret. The scheme pro-
vides the capability to share multiple secrets and to dynamically add or remove
participants online, without having to redistribute new secret shares to current
participants. These additional features are obtained by storing authentic (but
not secret) information at a publicly accessible location such as a notice board.
Pinch [6] pointed out that Cachin's scheme does not allow the shares to
be reused after the secret has been reconstructed without a further distributed
computation, as in Goldreich et al. [4]. Pinch presented a protocol for online
multiple secret sharing, based on the intractability of the Die-Hellmanproblem,
in which the shares can be reused. Ghodosi et al. [3] pointed out that Pinch's
scheme is also vulnerable to cheating. They presented a modied version of
Pinch's protocol which detects and prevents cheating, under the assumption that
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a majority of the participants of the authorised reconstruction set are honest.
However this scheme does not protect a minority of participants of the authorised
set from a colluding majority, who falsely accuses the minority of cheating.
We propose a computationally secure online secret sharing scheme which
is based on the intractability of the factoring problem. Compared to Pinch's
scheme, and its modication by Ghodosi et al., our scheme has the following
advantages: it detects cheating and enables the identication of all cheaters by
an arbitrator, regardless of their number. The scheme does not rely on a \last
participant" who reconstructs the secret on behalf of a minimal trusted set of
participants: the responsibility is diused among all participants.
The proposed scheme has potential practical applications in situations where
the participants, the access rules, or the secret itself frequently change. No new
shares have to be distributed secretly when new participants join the system
or participants leave. Such situations often arise in key management, escrowed
encryption systems, and so forth.
2 Preliminaries
A secret sharing scheme is a protocol involving a set P = fP
1
; : : : ; P
n
g of par-
ticipants and a dealer D, where D 62 P. Let    2
P
be an access structure. The
dealer D chooses a secret K and distributes privately to each participant P
i
2 P
a share S
i
of K such that: (i) any authorised set X 2   can reconstruct the
secret K from its shares, (ii) no unauthorised set X 62   can do so. Let  

  
be the set of minimal authorised sets, that is, of sets X such that: Y  X and
Y 2   implies that Y = X.
Let N = pq be the product of two large primes p and q, and let e (1 < e <
(N )) be chosen so that (e; (N )) = 1, where (N ) = (p  1)(q  1). The values
N and e are public, and the values p, q and (N ) are secret. Throughout this
paper we work within the multiplicative group of integers modulo N , and we
shall assume that factoring N is infeasible [7].
In the secret sharing schemes we will describe below we shall make use of a
one-way hash-function f which is collision-resistant. For further information see
Sections 9.2 and 9.7 of [5]. In order to identify all cheaters, every participant will
use an agreed digital signature scheme, and must have selected a private/public
key pair for this scheme. Moreover, every participant must have a means of
obtaining a veried copy of the public signature verication key of every other
participant. This could, for example, be provided by having a Trusted Third
Party (e.g. the dealer, D) certify the public key of every participant, and having
every participant distribute their certicate with every signed message they send.
3 A secret sharing protocol
We now present a new secret sharing protocol in which the participants of an au-
thorised set compute the secret K by combining their secret shares in encrypted
form. In this way the participants will not reveal their secret shares during the
process of recovering K. The protocol uses a publicly accessible location, e.g. a
notice board, where the dealer can store non-forgeable information accessible to
all participants. This location will, at least, indicate the number of participants
n and the access structure   .
The basic protocol to share the secret K is as follows:
First the dealer D selects N and e, and randomly chooses secret shares S
i
< N ,
1  i  n. Then D transmits to each P
i
over a secure channel the share S
i
, and
securely stores S
i
for subsequent use to identify cheaters, if cheating is detected.
For each minimal authorised set X 2  

the dealer D uses e and N to compute
T
X
= K  f(
Q
x:P
x
2X
S
e
x
mod N );
where  denotes exclusive-or of bit-strings. The dealer D posts the following
items on the notice board: the four-tuple (X; e;N; T
X
) for every X 2  

, and
the value f(K).
A minimal authorised set X 2  

of participants can compute K by performing
the following steps:
1. Each participant P
i
2 X reads f(K) and the values e;N; T
X
from the four-
tuple corresponding to the appropriate set X on the notice board. Then P
i
computes S
e
i
mod N and signs the data (S
e
i
mod N;X; e;N ) using his/her
private signature key to form s
P
i
= sign
P
i
(S
e
i
mod N jjXjjejjN ), where jj
denotes concatenation of data items. Finally, S
e
i
mod N and s
P
i
are sent by
each participant P
i
to all the other participants in X.
2. Each participant P
i
2 X veries all the signatures it has received, by using
the public keys of the senders, and then computes
V
X
=
Q
x:P
x
2X
S
e
x
mod N:
3. Each participant P
i
2 X reads T
X
from the notice board and reconstructs
K as follows:
K = T
X
 f(V
X
):
One can easily verify the completeness of the protocol: every authorised sub-
set X 2   will recover K.
A generalisation of this scheme can be used to share multiple secrets K
h
,
h = 1; 2; : : : ;m. It is possible to use the same one-way hash-function f and the
same set of secret shares S
1
; S
2
; : : : ; S
n
to share all the secrets K
h
. Whenever a
new secret K
h
is to be shared, the access structure may be dierent to that used
for previous secrets, and hence we denote the access structure for secret K
h
by
 
h
. For each secret K
h
the dealer D chooses a fresh pair (e
h
; N
h
), where it is
essential that D chooses a distinct modulus N
h
for every secret K
h
. For each
X 2  
h
the dealer computes
T
X;h
= K
h
 f(
Q
x:P
x
2X
S
e
h
x
mod N
h
) ; h = 1; 2; : : : ;m
and publishes the following items on the notice board:
(X; e
h
; N
h
; T
X;h
) and f(K
h
); h = 1; 2; : : : ;m:
The reconstruction of the secret is as before.
The properties of well-chosen pairs (e
h
; N
h
) and the function f , ensure that
the reuse of the set of secret shares S
1
; S
2
; : : : ; S
n
does not leak any information
which may be useful to cheaters and/or other malicious users.
4 Analysis of the protocol
The proposed protocol described in the previous section has the following prop-
erties.
4.1 How cheating may occur
In both the proposed protocol and its generalisation to multiple secrets it is
possible for one of the participants to cheat the others in such a way that the
cheater will get the correct secret but the other participants do not.
Suppose that participant P
j
contributes a fake encrypted share S
0
instead
of S
e
j
mod N . Then every participant of the authorised set X will compute V
X
incorrectly as V
0
X
= S
0

Q
x6=j:P
x
2X
S
e
i
mod N instead of V
X
=
Q
x:P
x
2X
S
e
i
mod
N . However P
j
, who knows S
e
j
mod N , can calculate the correct secret V
X
.
4.2 How to detect cheating
In the initialisation phase of the scheme, the dealer D publishes f(K
h
) on the
notice board for every secret K
h
that is being shared. Every participant, having
reconstructed the secret (K
0
h
, say), can verify its validity by hashing it and
comparing the resulting hashed value f(K
0
h
) with the value on the notice board.
If the verication fails, then most probably cheating has occurred in the protocol
and thus the computed secret is not correct. This test detects cheating but does
not identify the cheater(s). We now show how to identify all the cheaters.
4.3 How to identify all cheaters
In the event of cheating having been detected by the method just described,
the participants in the authorised set X can appeal to the dealer D to help
discover the identity of the cheaters. Notice that the dealer will only be involved
in arbitration after cheating has been detected, and will not need to be actively
involved in the normal operation of the reconstruction phase of the scheme.
In order to identify all cheaters, every participant P
i
2 X sends to the dealer
the data received during execution of the protocol, signed with their private
key. The dealer veries the signed data received from each P
i
, and compares the
submitted value of S
e
i
mod N , with that computed by using the stored value of
the share S
i
. If a submitted value is dierent from the calculated value, then
most probably P
i
cheated. P
i
cannot claim to have been framed, since D has
P
i
's signature s
P
i
on (S
e
i
mod N jjXjjejjN ). Therefore, the dealer will be able to
identify all the parties who sent incorrect values during the protocol.
This use of signatures will also protect a minority of participants of an autho-
rised set from a colluding majority who falsely accuses the minority of cheating.
5 Conclusion
We have presented a scheme which allows the reconstruction of an arbitrary
number of secrets and provides the capability to dynamically add or remove
participants online, without having to redistribute new shares secretly to current
participants by storing additional authentic (but not secret) information on the
notice board.
In addition, this scheme can be used in such a way that cheating by partici-
pants will be detected, in which case the participants of an authorised set X can
request help from the dealer D, who can always uniquely identify the cheaters.
6 Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to Fred Piper for his support, and to Peter Wild and
Karl Brincat for comments on an early draft of the paper.
References
1. G.R. Blakley. Safeguarding cryptographic keys. In Proceedings of AFIPS National
Computer Conference, pp. 313{317, 1979.
2. C. Cachin. On-line secret sharing. In C. Boyd, editor, Proceedings of the 5th IMA
Conference on Cryptography and Coding, pp. 190{198. Springer-Verlag, 1995.
3. H. Ghodosi, J. Pieprzyk, G.R. Chaudhry, and J. Seberry. How to prevent cheating
in Pinch's scheme. Electronics Letters, 33(17):1453{1454, 1997.
4. O. Goldreich, S. Micali, and A. Widgerson. How to play any mental game or a
completeness theorem for protocols with honest majority. In Proceedings of 19th
ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, pp. 218{229, 1987.
5. A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, and S. Vanstone. Handbook of Applied Cryptography.
CRC Press, 1996.
6. R.G.E. Pinch. Online multiple secret sharing. Electronics Letters, 32(12):1087{
1088, 1996.
7. R.L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman. A method for obtaining digital signatures
and public key cryptosystems. Communications of the ACM, 21:120{126, 1978.
8. A. Shamir. How to share a secret. Communications of the ACM, 22:612{613, 1979.
9. M. Tompa and H. Woll. How to share a secret with cheaters. Journal of Cryptology,
1:133{138, 1988.
